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“THE END OF THE LAW IS PEACE. THE MEANS TO 
THIS END IS WAR”: JHERING, LEAL EDUCATION AND 
DIGITAL VISUALISATION.  
I want to die a slave to principles. Not to men
1
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Abstract: The paper describes a novel approach to the visualisation of legal argumen-
tation, aimed at training legal professionals in Mexico. The approach that draws its 
inspiration from battle maps used in military history is discussed in a jurisprudential 
and legal-historical setting. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This is a violent paper. There will be murder most horrid. The bagpipes will play, 
the highland charge is performed, and blood will be spilled, all for the benefit of 
education, though no student was harmed in the research for this paper. Reader 
discretion is advised. Despite this uncharacteristic violence, it shares a key concern 
with Friedrich Lahmayer’s work. Its topic is a new approach to visualisation in legal 
education. Anyone who ever had the benefit of seeing Friedrich Lachmayer give, 
nay, perform a presentation,  knows that a particular interest of his is to depict the 
dynamic aspect of visualisation, the process of legal thinking that he tries  to depict 
and not just its end product, logical  form of a legal decision. Graphical representa-
tions of argument structures in the tradition of Wigmore charts or Toulmin dia-
grams typically give a static picture of an argument, with the relation between 
propositions frozen in time. While this can aid the understanding of the underlying 
logical form, it abstracts away an important aspect of „real life“ legal argumentation, 
the insight that law typically takes place in a dispute between parties and therefore 
is always essentially contested. We too will try to find new ways of representing this 
dynamic aspect, but where for Lachmayer, a key inspiration is the Mandala, for us it 
is the battle map, and where he emphasises oneness, we will emphasise division. 
But this, in turn, is just another way to maintain the balance for which the Mandala 
stands, Shiva needs her Kali, whose role as slayer of demons we will take on  for this 
paper. 
We take our lead from Rudolf von Jhering, sometime holder of the chair of Roman 
Law at Vienna and his observation of the role of peace and war in thinking about 
the law and legal education.  In the public lecture that was to form the backbone for 




                                                          
2  Der Kampf um das Recht. Vortrag des Hofrates Professor Jhering, Gehalten in der Wiener 
Juristischen Gesellschaft am 11. März 1872 notes from a stenograph available at  
http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fontes/JheringDerKampfumsRecht.htm. The English 
Translation of the published  version, “The struggle for  law” omits the reference to legal 
education 
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„Von diesen beiden Auffassungen nun ist es gerade die eine, daß das Recht 
vorzugsweise die Ruhe, die Ordnung, der Friede sei, welcher unsere romanistische 
Wissenschaft vorzugsweise Geltung erworben hat. Wenn ein junger Mensch aus 
den Vorlesungen über römisches Recht ins praktische Leben tritt, so wird er etwa 
von folgenden Vorstellungen erfüllt sein: das Recht entwickelt sich, (wie es Savigny 
dargestellt hat) wie die Sprache aus dem Volksgefühle heraus; die vollen Ideen des 
Rechtes, die brechen sich von selbst Bahn, d. i. das Gewohnheitsrecht; es ist das also 
die Macht der rechtlichen Ueberzeugung, die sich hier bewährt hat. Daß diese 
Ueberzeugungen aber einen Kampf zu kämpfen haben, der bei der Entwicklung der 
Sprache und ebenso der Kunst gar nicht stattfindet, das tritt bei seinen 
Vorstellungen in den Hintergrund„   
In the book that resulted from this lecture, his imagery is even starker:
3
 
“So long as the law is compelled to hold itself in readiness to resist the attacks of 
wrong - and this it will be compelled to do until the end of time - it cannot dispense 
with war. The life of the law is a struggle, - a struggle of nations, of the state power, 
of classes, of individuals. All the law in the world has been obtained by strife.  Every 
principle of law which obtains had first to be wrung by force from those who denied 
it; and every legal right - the legal rights of a whole nation as well as those of indi-
viduals - supposes a continual readiness to assert it and defend it. The law is not 
mere theory, but living force.” 
This image of law as peaceful yet ultimately static order, born out of the “common 
law” (Gewohnheitsrecht) is particularly precarious when applied to post-
revolutionary legal orders, where justice is in transition, concepts essentially con-
tested, and the new consensus as yet to be forged. Our own research is placed in the 
context of the transition of Mexico from a civil law system to one that follows in-
creasingly  the approach  of its main trading partner, the common law system of the 
United States. We will describe a new approach to formalise legal argumentation 
that tries to stay true to the “combat element” and depicts the “battle of the con-
cepts” for supremacy. We demonstrate how visualisation methods used in military 
history  can be re-purposed to depict the battle between two parties in adversarial 
litigation, taking as example the case of Carney v US, which had become the stand-
ard for AI supported argument analysis ever since it featured as the main  example  
in the works on legal AI by  Kevin Ashley. In the first  section, we briefly describe 
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the current developments in Mexico and its shift from inquisitorial to adversarial 
procedures.  We then put this development in a jurisprudential and historical con-
text that further analyses the structural similarities between legal argumentation 
and armed conflict.  We then briefly outline a radical departure from traditional 
argumentation visualization techniques: the battle of the precedents. Drawing our 
inspiration from familiar battle and campaign maps, we argue that the semantic 
richness of this type of visualization, and its ability to present dynamic interaction 
between forces of different strength  makes it particularly suitable for our purposes.  
 
2 Preparing the Battle Ground 
In this first part, we briefly introduce the setting for our study, discussing the transi-
tions that the legal system of Mexico is currently experiencing form a comparative-
legal and jurisprudential perspective.  
Over  the last decade, the role and working practice of the Mexican federal judiciary 
has changed dramatically. The judiciary is in the process of becoming a more confi-
dent and active precedent-giver and also precedent-user, moving away from its 
historical self-understanding as part of a civilian jurisdiction and orienting itself 
more towards the USA as the predominant economic power in the region. Integra-
tion in NAFTA and constitutional reform under the last government all played a 
role in a process that changes not just the use of precedents, but pushes the judicial 
system in its entirety towards an adversarial, common law approach that emphasiz-
es adversarial, oral procedure, cross examination of witnesses and public pleadings.  
As a result, more federal precedents are issued, published and made available to all 
legal professionals, and also used more frequently than in the past in judgements by 
lower courts.
4
 However, this fundamental change in ‘legal style’ has not been prob-
lem-free for the legal community. In 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice published 
the results of a comprehensive, three-year-long study of the perceived problems 
that judges, officials and legal practitioners in Mexico face with the administration 
of justice. The research conclusions and the working papers show that legal practi-
tioners experience disorientation when dealing with precedents and their  role in 
daily practice
5
. Complaints concern both the quantity and the consistency of prece-
dents: Faced with what appears to be a deluge of often mutually inconsistent deci-
                                                          
4  Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación. 2006 p 166 
5  Ibid, 166–8. 
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sions, legal professionals feel left alone in deciding which of these  are the “right” 
ones to use in a given case.   What was intended to increase legal certainty is per-
ceived as having the opposite effect, creating confusion and a perceived loss in legal 
certainty and predictability.
6
 Respondents to the government inquiry list as desid-
erata the enactment of  clear rules on how to give weight to conflicting precedents; 
that courts should issue fewer precedents; that contradictions should be avoided by 
institutional incentives and that institutional efforts should be put into practice to 
unify precedents.
7
 In short, what was asked for can be understood as no less than a 
‘codification of precedent-based reasoning’ – defying in a sense the very reason for 
moving away from the codes towards an increased use of precedents in the first 
place. What create certainty in the view of these practitioners are codified abstract 
rules. Psychologically, we can understand this reaction as a form of cognitive inertia 
or cognitive dissonance: faced with massive changes across all aspects of the legal 
profession (and indeed wider society and politics) in a short period of time, practi-
tioners in Mexico cling to their learned reasoning and behaviour pattern especially 
strongly where it comes to the core of their self-understanding and what it means to 
think legally. In 2007 a public enquiry raised by the Senate of the Mexican Republic 
regarding the functioning and future reform agenda for the judiciary raised similar 
concerns and questions about precedents.
8
 
On closer inspection though, we find that the amount of information available to 
legal practitioners does not seem to be excessive compared to that available in other 
legal systems – in fact, quite the opposite. Second, for the common lawyer it is self-
evident that precedents are models of decisions with variable degrees of authority, 
persuasiveness and ‘on point-edness’, and as such cannot be used in an all-or-
nothing way; they usually help practitioners in building functional maps of the law 
and in making inferences. The problem then is that Mexican legal practitioners 
treat precedents as if they were the same as legal rules laid down in codes, reinter-
preting them through the cognitive-conceptual framework they acquired when in 
law school.  
What this understanding misses is that a system of precedents provides a more or 
less wide range of past decisions with varying degrees of authority. Their weight can 
be evaluated according to a set of complex considerations, both formal and substan-
                                                          
6  Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 2006 p. 168 
7  Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Libro Blanco de la Reforma Judicial, 166–169 
8  Senado de la República, 2007 
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tive – precedents of lower courts are normally trumped by precedents of higher 
courts, older decisions normally by newer decisions, tangential decisions by on-
point decisions, etc. Experience and “intuition”, rather than strict rules, then tells a 
lawyer how to handle a conflict between a recent, but low level court decision and 
an older, but higher ranking court. Aspects that determine the weight also include 
whether the case was decided by a slim majority or was an unanimous decisions, 
and whether the specific part that is cited is core of the ratio or a mere obiter.
9
 
Precedents are also sensitive to their relations to other precedents, in particular  
precedents often form clusters to make strong ‘fronts’ that then needs stronger  
‘attacks’ from contradictory precedents than they would individually. In the (civil-
ian) German legal system, this is known as ‘ständige Rechtsprechung’ or ‘consoli-
dated jurisprudence’ – the recognition that sometimes a consensus emerges across a 
variety of cases over an extended period of time. This gives the position a consider-
ably higher weight than a single precedent and can even trump precedents from a 
notionally higher-ranking court. 
Thus, precedents can be understood as past decisions providing context-sensitive 
models that point with variable force towards a certain direction, guiding future 
decisions. As such, precedents do not have all-or-nothing validity, but are better 
understood as having degrees of authority, soundness or force, and, as MacCormick 
and Summers point out, ‘this is a truth already understood in some quarters within 
common law systems, but the partial convergence of civil law systems [… ]requires 
us to face up to it frontally’.
10
 
Here we argue that the perceived information overload that legal practitioners 
report in Mexico is the result of their image of the law and the corresponding cogni-
tive toolbox they have at their disposal. The image of the law circulating within this 
legal system is that of classical legal positivism that depicts the law as a system of 
rules from which practitioners should identify those which apply to the particular 
case.
11
 The rules are valid or invalid and therefore are applicable or inapplicable, 
binding or not binding: in this model, there is no place for degree of force. As 
Duxbury argued: ‘precedents, unlike statutes, do not bind judges in an all-or-
nothing fashion, that the binding force of a precedent is best explained not in terms 
of its validity (this being a non-scalar concept) but in terms of its authority (of 
                                                          
9  Atiyah and Summers 1987 p115–16 
10  MacCormick and Summers 1997, p.544 
11  Cáceres 2002 
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which there can be degrees)’.
12
 These schemata used by common lawyers t make 
sense of precedents are not taught in Mexico. For example even the  most authorita-
tive introductory book for legal studies in Mexico only gives seven to the issue of 
precedents, the so-called jurisprudencia;  and here too we find an immediate appeal 
to statutes when problems are encountered – for example, ‘when there is normative 
contradiction it is not possible that the incompatible precedents are both valid’ or 
‘determining if two contradictory precepts have or have not binding force is not a 
problem for logic but something that only positive law can solve’.
13
 Maynez’s lan-
guage is that of (all-or-nothing) bindingness, validity and applicability, and in this 
account there is no room for evaluations of normative soundness that function as a 
matter of degree. 
Legal practitioners in Mexico seem to have deeply internalized during their forma-
tive years an image of the law incompatible with the way in which legal precedents 
work in a legal system. But common (or civilian) lawyers are not born, they are 
made. Studying legal education and the way in which it imparts certain cognitive 
traits on its ‘raw material’ should therefore be, in our view, integral to both the 
jurisprudential question pertaining to the nature of legal knowledge and the com-
parative legal question regarding the most basic differences and commonalities 
between legal systems. As Jhering had emphasised, if we can prevent students leav-
ing university from having internalised an inappropriate image of law, we can hope 
to support the transition of a legal system such as Mexico’s from a statute-based 
civilian system to a precedent-based system.   How then can we turn students from 
“peaceful” academics into fighters who can marshal their precedents to the greatest 
effect and win battles on the mean streets of legal practice? 
3 LET THE BATTLE COMMENCE 
In this second part, we develop the intellectual context for our approach, tracing 
back the often intimate relation between war and law through the centuries. We 
travel to Scotland, obviously, and spend some time with the last large judicial battle 
on the British Isles 
                                                          
12  Duxbury 2008 p23 
13  Garcia Maynez 2000: 68–75 
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3.1 All is Fair in Law and War 
 
Jhering’s notion that law and battle share structural similarities is by no means 
unique. In particular in common law countries do we find an understanding of the 
trial process that sees the interaction between the parties as a duel, the lawyers as 
the seconds and the judge as a neutral arbitrator. Karl Llewellyn, one of the most 
influential thinkers in the legal realist  movement, famously described the  „duelling  
canons of interpretation“  with metaphors from  fencing – for each  „thrust“ with 
one canon, there is a „parry“ to block it
14
  – and elsewhere,  using the ambiguity in 
the very word „canon“, he stated that „With this it should be clear, then, why our 
canons thunder.“
15
 We will discuss Llewellyn’s conclusions from his studies of US 
appeal courts later, and focus in particular on his attempt to reconcile the idea that 
while precedents can never force a unique decision, legal decision making is none-
theless not arbitrary.  There is another reason why he is an interesting author for 
our purposes – born into a family of German immigrants, he attempted to join the 
German army at the outbreak of WWI, was refused due to his unwillingness to 
renounce his  American citizenship, fought nonetheless with the Seventy-eighth 
Prussian Infantry and was wounded in service.
16
 Returning to the US, he promptly 
asked to join the US army once the States had joined the war against Germany – his 
previous conduct though resulted in a rejection from the US authorities  as well. 
The ability to argue with equal fervour for both sides of a dispute, one might say, is 
an essential quality in a lawyer, though Llewellyn may have taken the notion rather 
too far. Even more relevant for our purpose though is the influence Jhering had on 
Llewellyn’s thinking,
17
 an influence that became tangible in the transplantation of 
German legal thought into US law. Llewellyn took a lead in authoring the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
18
 This Code did not just, or not even mainly, transplant 
German substantive law to the US. Rather, it introduced a new style of writing 
codes, and with that a new cognitive approach to reasoning with formal rules. In the 
past, codified law in common law countries was distinguished by its high degree of 
detail and prescriptiveness to make it “judge proof”, that is to prevent the judiciary 
                                                          
14        Llewellyn, 1950; see also Sinclair 2006. 
 15  Llewellyn 1930 p. 6 
16  Twinig 1973 p. 91ff 
17  Grise, Gelter, and Whitman 2012 
 18  See e.g.Whitman 1987 
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to revert to their preferred mode of precedent  based reasoning as their cognitive 
default. Teleological interpretation was discouraged.  Llewellyn by contrast used 
general clauses liberally, forcing a rethink in judicial method and a promotion of 
purposive interpretation that was as radical –and for practitioners as unsettling
19
 - 
as that the Mexican judiciary is experiencing today.  
A second legal realist who contributed considerably to the understanding of law as a 
war-like activity was Llewellyn’s fellow realist Jerome Frank, judge at the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He contributed to the vocabulary of 
comparative law the distinction between “truth” and “fight” theories of legal proce-
dure, linking the former to the continental European model of inquisitorial trial, the 
latter to the common law model of adversarial litigation. On this, he writes:  “In 
short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning in the fight, not at aiding the court to 
discover the facts.” Frank linked his analysis to the history of the institution of the 
trial, citing approvingly Vinagradoff’s dictum that “an ancient trial was little more 
than a "formally regulated struggle between the parties in which the judge acted 




It is this last comment that we want to use as a springboard for a somewhat deeper 
analysis of the historical similarities between war and law. Wager of battle or judi-
cial duel („Gerichtskampf“) was a common   method of Germanic law to settle cer-
tain types of disputes, and as ubiquitous on the continent as it was in Britain. The 
“wager of war” could involve a duel between individuals, but also entire groups of 
fighters  lined up for battle. In Britain, the formal jury trial of the royal court re-
placed only slowly and incrementally the judicial wager of battle and the monopoly 
of the crown to exercise violence remained contested by powerful local interests for 
centuries. The clan system meant in particular for Scotland that the emerging state-
centric legal order kept elements of the older trial by combat – indeed, as Hector 
MacQueen showed, the right to challenge an opponent to a duel may still be a for-
mal part of the Scots law of evidence today, a common law right whose abolition 
may be outside the powers of Parliament.
21
  
The oldest documented case of a judicial combat in Britain was the trial of Wulfstan 
v. Walter from 1077 between an “indigenous” Saxon noble and a member of the new 
                                                          
 19  For a typical criticism see Danzig (1975 
 20  Frank 1950 
21  MacQueen 1986 




  Trial by combat is listed as the main form of procedure between 
aristocrats in the Tractatus of Glanvill from 1187, a highly influential codification of 
the evolving “Anglo-Norman” law whose key innovations such as the system of writs 
cast a long shadow over the common law until today.
23
  This code too was an exam-
ple of legal transplantation and the merger of different legal traditions, styles and 
ideals,  mainly  Anglo-Saxon and Norman legal concepts, though the role of  Roman 
law in Glanville remains contested.
24
    
Soon after however, trial by jury began to replace trial by combat. Central to this 
development was the emergence of the legal profession as an independent and 
powerful professional body in the 13th century. Lawyers began to steer their clients 
actively away from the physical risk of a trial by combat, developing in the  process 
highly sophisticated, if not sophistic, arguments and legal  fictions that   called for a 
trial by jury even in those cases when procedurally, a trial by combat would have 
been appropriate. The modern understanding of the lawyer as a party to the process 
who has primarily the interest of his client at heart goes back to this time,  and 
since dead clients are bad debtors, securing their survival at least until the proceed-
ings were completed became their  preeminent task.  This development shaped the 
emerging procedural law, and some of its repercussions can still be felt today, for 
instance the role of the lawyer to advise the client in the plea bargaining process.  
Even clearer though is the origin of the modern lawyer as quite literally a “champi-
on” for his side in the civil procedure of that time. There, woman, children and 
clergy were allowed to hire professional fighters to combat on their behalf. Docu-
mented is for instance that the household of  Bishop   Swinefield paid a certain  
Thomas of Brydges  not only an annual  retainer fee for acting as champion, salary 
and expenses (the Bishop seems to have been involved in quite a number of litiga-
tions) it also stipulated additional payments for  each fight that Thomas won on 
behalf of his master
25
 -  a “contingent fee” of the form hotly contested again in con-
temporary common law jurisdictions.
26
  
At the turn of the 13
th
 century however, trial by jury had largely replaced trial by 
combat – if not the duel between individuals, then at least the larger wager of bat-
                                                          
22  Thayer, 1891 
23  Barnes, 2008. 
24  See e.g. Re,  1993 
25      Neilson 1890 pp. 46–51 
26  See e.g. Moorhead, 1999; Kritzer 2001 
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tle. One of the last large judicial wagers of war took place 1396 in Scotland, in the 
„battle of the clans“ in Perth.  Considerable uncertainty surrounds this event, its 
historicity however is confirmed from a bill to the exchequer accounts that had an 
entry which states “For timber, iron, and making of a battlefield for 60 persons 
fighting on the inch at Perth, £14:25 or 14 pounds 2 shillings.” Access to justice, even 
then, came at a price, though the true costs would only become apparent after the 
trial was over. Here we will tell but one version of the story.
27
 The dispute itself was 
a side issue in the 350 year feud over territory and cattle between the Chattan con-
federation on one side – an unusual, semi-permanent alliance of Scottish clans 
including the  Clans Macpherson and Davidson – and Clan Cameron on the other.  
Having suffered bitter defeat at the Battle of Invernahavon, retaliation by the Cam-
erons resulted in bloodshed so frequent and so violent that finally, King Robert III 
chose to intervene. He threatened to arrest the leaders of the warring factions, how-
ever, his generals found it impossible to execute their orders without risking their 
own armies – the central power still being weak and contested.   Evoking the legal 
procedure of trial by wager, a “legal” solution was proposed.  Each side would pick 
thirty warriors, armed only with swords.  They would fight before the Court and the 
King sitting in judgement. Indemnity for all past offenses was promised to the loser, 
the victors however would get the property rights for the contested lands. A part of 
the river Tay was enclosed with a deep ditch to form an arena with seats for the 
spectators, King Robert sitting as judge on the field.
28
  
A small problem presented itself immediately – Clan Chattan was one man short, 
and none of the Cameronians was willing to give up his place in the battle order and 
the chance for glory.  At this point, a substitute volunteered who had no blood 
connection to the parties, a local blacksmith called  Henry Smith,  more famously 
known as   Hal o' the Wynd  His payment was to be  half a French crown of gold, 
and a position for life  if he survived. If a lawyer is someone willing to fight for mon-
ey for an arbitrary stranger in a trial, then we can also think of Henry Smith as a 
proto-lawyer. With both sides now at parity, battle could commence. 
                                                          
27  For a fuller account, see http://unknownscottishhistory.com/pdf/The Battle of the North 
Inch.pdf; dated, but still an important source is Shaw 1874. 
28  The ideal of public trial is of course another traditional feature of common law litigation, 
and indeed another of the changes Mexico is introducing.  As William Blackstone, the great 
English law commentator, would write in 1789: This open examination of witnesses viva 
voce, IN THE PRESENCE OF ALL MANKIND, is much more conducive to the clearing up of 
truth, than the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or 
his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from 
the civil law. William Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:349--67, 370--81, 383--85 
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“ The trumpets of the King sounded a charge, the bagpipes blew up their 
screaming and maddening notes, and the combatants, starting forward in 
regular order, and increasing their pace, till they came to a smart run, met 
together in the centre of the ground, as a furious land torrent encounters 
an advancing tide. 
Blood flowed fast, and the groans of those who fell began to mingle with 
the cries of those who fought. The wild notes of the pipes were still heard 
above the tumult and stimulated to further exertion the fury of the com-
batants. 
At once, however, as if by mutual agreement, the instruments sounded a 
retreat. The two parties disengaged themselves from each other to take 
breath for a few minutes. About twenty of both sides lay on the field, dead 
or dying; arms and legs lopped off, heads cleft to the chin, slashes deep 
through the shoulder to the breast, showed at once the fury of the combat, 
the ghastly character of the weapons used, and the fatal strength of the 
arms which wielded them.” 
The end came quickly. An anonymous historian summarised the outcome 500 years 
after the event like this:
30
 “The encounter was maintained on both sides with incon-
ceivable fury; but, at length, by the superior valour, strength, and skill of Henry 
Wynd, victory declared herself for the clan Chattan. Of them no more than ten, 
besides Wynd, were left alive, and all dangerously wounded. The combatants of the 
Clan Kay were all cut off, excepting one, who remained unhurt, threw himself into 
the Tay (River), and escaped to the opposite bank.” Only 12 of the initial 60 “party 
litigants” survived, amongst them Wynd, whose prowess at arms contributed con-
siderably to the Chattan victory. Then as today, it pays to spend money on a good 
lawyer.  
While Clan Chattan received the coveted legal title to the land by Royal decree, the 
hope that the  trial had ended the conflict was in vain. A short period of piece en-
sured  as the best fighters on both sides had been slain, but soon the feuding would 
                                                          
29  Walter Scott, St. Valentine's Day; or, The Fair Maid of Perth (Chronicles of the Canongate, 
Second Series)  Edinburgh: Printed for Cadell and Co., Edinburgh; 1828. Chapter 34 
30  Anon., 1780 
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start anew. This battle, which had been orchestrated to end to tensions between the 
two rival clans, had thus only the effect of "suspending" actions for a number of 
years but it did nothing to eliminate the on-going feud in the future. There too may 
lie a lesson for the present – litigation rarely solves a conflict, it merely manages 
them.  
With the battle of the clans the tradition of wager of battle as a method of judicial 
dispute resolution disappears from the history books. Duels between  individual 
litigants in court however remained an option for centuries to come.  Queen Eliza-
beth I reign saw the judicial duel between Connor MacCormack O'Connor and Teig 
McGilpatrick O'Connor. Adam Loftus, Archbishop of Dublin, was one of the presid-
ing Lords Justices in the case, along with Sir Henry Wallop in a trial that took place 
in   Dublin Castle on 7 September 1583.
31
 The litigants had  accused each other of 
treason,  and  the privy council had granted their wish for trial by combat.  An ac-
count of the proceedings as observed by one of the Privy Councillors is given in the 
State papers Ireland 63/104/69: 
   “The first combat was performed at the time and place accordingly with observa-
tion of all due ceremonies as so short a time would suffer, wherein both parties 
showed great courage by a desperate fight: In which Conor was slain and Teig hurt 
but not mortally, the more was the pity” Conor had been a “wild” Gaelic chieftain, 
Teig “semi-wild”, that is in the parlance of the day willing to work with the English. 
Had Teig died as well, the property would have fallen to the – English – crown. Even 
in a trial by duel, then as today, ultimately the lawyers are bound the make the 
greatest profit.  
It is unclear when the last trial by duel in Britain took place. But we know that trial 
by combat remained on the statute books, mainly due to records of failed attempts 
to have it abolished.
32
  In 1774, and as a response to the Boston Tea Party, Parlia-
ment considered a bill which would have abolished private prosecutions of murder, 
the legal form most likely to result in trial by battle. It was successfully opposed by 
Member of Parliament John Dunning, who called the “appeal” (private prosecution) 
of murder" that great pillar of the Constitution".
33
 Here we see one of the reasons 
why trial by duel remained part of the legal process in the UK, but not on the conti-
nent: any attempt to monopolise legal powers by the state was met with suspicion, 
                                                          
31  Fitz Gerald 1910  
32  Megarry and Garner  2005, p. 62. 
33  Shoenfeld 1997 p  61 
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and the right to privately challenge criminals, not relying on a crown prosecutor, 
was part of this understanding that also saw the police officer as nothing else but a 
citizen in uniform, and the citizen as a plainclothes policeman, both with equal 
rights (but differing duties).
34
 
The issue came to the boil in the famous case of  Ashford v Thornton.
35
  This case 
upheld the right of a defendant who had been acquitted in a case brought by the 
crown, and now faced a private appeal by a relative of the victim,  to challenge the 
accuser to trial by battle. In 1817, Abraham Thornton was charged with the murder 
of Mary Ashford whom he had met at a dance.  The next morning, she  was found 
drowned in a pit,  most likely victim of  a sexual assault. In the absence of any direct 
evidence against Thornton though, the jury acquitted him. Mary's brother launched 
a private  appeal. Thornton then claimed the right to trial by battle, The judges, 
deciding on this request, granted it despite their misgivings: 
 Lord Ellenborough: 
“The discussion which has taken place here, and the consideration which 
has been given to the facts alleged, most conclusively show that this is not 
a case that can admit of no denial or proof to the contrary; under these cir-
cumstances, however obnoxious I am myself to the trial by battle, it is the 
mode of trial which we, in our judicial character, are bound to award. We 
are delivering the law as it is, and not as we wish it to be, and therefore we 
must pronounce our judgment, that the battle must take place.”
36
 
The judges however also came up with a solution that ultimately avoided the battle 
in this case, leaning on Ashford to grant Thornton a release without obligation to 
return to court. His lawyers had no illusions who would win that fight, the brutal 
and experienced fighter Thornton, or their bookish client. In a letter to his clerk, he 
wrote: “I am very apprehensive our poor little Knight will never be able to contend 
the Battle with his brutish opponent.”
37
 Common sense prevailed, and Ashcroft 
withdrew the accusation. The case however lives on, if in disguise – it provided the 
inspiration of the duel scene in Sir Walter Scott’s Ivenhoe.
38
  
                                                          
34  Schafer 2013 
35  Ashford v Thornton (1818) 106 ER 149 
36  Hall 1926 p. 179 
37  Ibid at 175 
38  Dyer 1997 
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Parliament abolished wager of battle shortly after. While this should have been the 
end of the story of trial by combat, this underestimates the ingenuity of the British 
citizen. In December 2002, a 60-year-old mechanic challenged the  Driver and Vehi-
cle Licensing Agency over a £25 fine. He claimed a right to  a  trial by combat under 
the old law, arguing that its repeal  was not constitutional. The DLVA was asked to 
nominate a "champion", the fight would ube to the death, using “"samurai swords, 
Ghurka knives or heavy hammers". This claim was however denied by a court of 
magistrates in Bury St Edmunds, and he was further fined
39
 
While we find trial by combat also in medieval Germany and France, there it disap-
peared much earlier than in Britain, and with much less of a conceptual legacy.
40
 
We indicated some of the reasons above: Establishing a judicial monopoly of the 
state was in the UK a slow, evolutionary process that was at every step opposed not 
just by powerful local interest, but also by a stronger integration of the populace in 
the justice system, from the role of the juror to the citizen as “special constable”.  
We also noted the much more prominent role of the legal profession, in particular 
trial lawyers, in shaping the procedural law in the UK. This also found its expression 
in the structure of legal education. In the UK, training young lawyers remained until 
very recently a prerogative of the legal profession; training was vocational, on the 
job and by “battle hardened” practitioners.  By contrast, legal education on the 
continent became a role for universities and academics, the goal of the education a 
position as a judge, whose overriding duty to the state put him in the position of 
“peacemaker” rather than “warrior”.  In the UK, law degrees are accredited by the 
legal profession, the Law Societies of England and Scotland respectively, in Germa-
ny, examination is by the state and the judiciary continues to play a decisive role in 
shaping the curriculum. German professors often hold position as judges, their UK 
counterparts very rarely, but the absence of the habilitation and a tradition of aca-
demic legal writing facilitates the vertical movement of experienced litigators into 
the academy.  
These differences too are behind the picture that Jhering lamented in our introduc-
tory quote.  Now, it may seem a bit unfair to juxtapose the mild mannered academic 
Jhering with the violence of the “battle of the clans”. Surely, for all his appeal to the 
concept of “struggle”, he did not mean to equip students with swords  and these 
days, Health and Safety regulations would surely prevent this. Yet, when he com-
                                                          
39  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1416262/Court-refuses-trial-by-combat.html 
40  See e.g. Vogel 1998   
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pares legal disputes with wars between states, and with duels between knights, he 
reminds us also of the pedagogical value of these comparisons: “Even in the case of 
the action at law, there was a time when the parties to the action themselves we 
called on to enter the lists, and when the true meaning of the struggle was thus 
made to appear.” To revel the “true meaning” behind the nature of the trial, but 
without injuring our students in the process,  we want to explore if we can revive 
through  digital visualisation  the combative sprit of legal argumentation and to 
realign  the  modern practice of trial court  reasoning with the judicial battle from  
which it originated. This will be the topic of the next paragraph.     
4 JOINING THE BATTLE 
On the  basis of the discussion above, we will now propose an way to represent case 
based reasoning that emphasises the adversarial use of precedents of different 
weight. History, and more specifically military history, has for a long time used 
visualizations that match all the above criteria in the form of the ubiquitous battle 
maps. These visualizations typically develop a semantic that is sufficiently con-
straint to allow a degree of standardized interpretation. 
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Figure 1 Explanation of ‘attack in oblique order’,41  
The different size of boxes and arrows is used to describe  different strengths of a 
unit and different strengths of an attack respectively. This does not merely help to 
depict a historical battle – it is also used in the training of officers, playing a causal, 
explanatory role why one general defeated the other. The skill that the officer takes 
from this is the ability to see, immediately and without the need for complex calcu-
lations, how a combination of forces and environment creates winnable and inde-
fensible positions and strategies. It is this causal, explanatory element aided by 
visualization that we are most interested in here. In a legal setting, we can now 
think of precedents as individual units. The difference in size corresponds to the 
‘objective’ strength of a precedent (for example, the Supreme Court versus the Court 
of First Instance), whereas the size of the arrow expresses the strength of the use of 
the precedent in a given context – an on-point precedent will be stronger than a 
tangential one, for instance. In the example, we can see also how a learner would 
immediately identify the cluster on the right-hand side – a form of ‘cohesiveness’ 
that creates a centre of gravity and that goes beyond a simple ‘support relation’, so 
that all units support each other. Clusters of precedents are used in the same way in 
legal argumentation. They work not because there is an explicit linear support rela-
tion in the sense, for example, of Toulmin’s warrant or support between them, but 
because their joint effect gives additional strength to the argument that is proposed. 
This type of “clustering” plays a crucial role in Llewellyn’s own analysis of the per-
suasive force of precedents, and plays a crucial role in explaining why court deci-
sions, though short of logically necessary, are far from arbitrary. The same holds 
true with battles – while it is possible that they could have ended differently from 
the way they did, we can also see how more and more unlikely a divergent outcome 
becomes once key decisions are taken.  
In battles fought between coalitions, visual markers can be used to distinguish in-
ternal subdivisions within a side – and the learner will begin to ‘see’ and understand 
them as a possible source of weakness, despite their possible utility. In the same 
way, persuasive but non-binding precedents from other jurisdictions can be marked 
up as ‘auxiliary troops’ within a coalition. Procedural moves at the initial stage of a 
                                                          
41  From http://www.theartofbattle.com/, with kind permission. This website has excellent 
animated battle maps, the reader can get a very good idea of how our ultimate ambition is, 
though so far their skills surpass ours 
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hearing finally correspond to typical skirmishing attacks that do little but prepare 
the ground for the real issue, even if they sometimes can strike lucky.  
 A quick example, based on the case of California v. Carney, can help illustrate this 
approach: the rule to be interpreted requires a warrant for the search of a person’s 
dwellings. Carney is the example used by Kevin Ashley in his highly influential 
HYPO, CATO and LARGO suit of legal AI systems which all involve argumentation 
visualisation.
42
 We discussed the strength (and possible weaknesses) of this ap-
proach elsewhere, like most other argument visualisation tools, it depicts logical 
connections, but not “argumentative weight” of the type we are interested in.
43
  
What were the facts of Carney? Carney was suspected of selling marijuana from his 
Dodge Mini Motor home, in which he lived. While Carney was away, one officer 
entered without a warrant and searched the vehicle, finding drugs. Carney mo-
tioned to suppress the evidence, since warrantless searches of a person’s home are 
prohibited under the US constitution.   The motion was denied by the trial court. 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the automobile exception that 
allows searches of vehicles without a warrant also applied to a motor home. The 
California Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is a greater expectation of 
privacy in a motor home when also used for living quarters, so the automobile ex-
ception did not apply. The legal question then was whether motor homes are dwell-
ings for the purposes of the law.  
In the trial, the prosecution proposes a test: if the place that is searched has wheels 
and is self-propelling, then no warrant is required, as it is a car. The justification for 
this is based on principles, which in turn are derived from a history of precedents. 
One principle is that rules should be clear-cut and nothing seems easier than count-
ing wheels. The defence offers an alternative test: if the place that is searched is 
used as a home and has the features commonly associated with one (such as a bed), 
then a warrant is required, as it is a home. Again, principles derived from prece-
dents support this view, here the principle that privacy needs protecting. At the oral 
presentation, the judge then queries both tests using hypotheticals. For example, he 
asks of the prosecution: assume a case (the hypothetical) where the motor home has 
wheels and a motor, but is on a permanent parking lot, has gas pipes and electricity 
wires permanently attached to it, and cannot move without causing damage. Would 
you still want to apply your test and treat it as a car? At this point, the prosecution 
                                                          
42  See e.g. Ashley 2009, Ashley at al 2002 
43  Voyatzis and Schafer 2013 
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can either stick to its guns and argue that this case also should be decided under its 
proposed test (and hence be deemed a car) or it can refine the test by excluding, for 
example, situations where the car is permanently attached to an unmovable struc-
ture and in a way becomes part of it. 
This type of reasoning can be found frequently in SCOTUS hearings. In addition, it 
also plays a major role in US teaching practice, linked to the ‘Socratic model of 
education’.
44
 Ashley argues that it is a suitable tool to explain and motivate rule 
choice and contextual and policy analyses.
45
 Citing from the Best Practices for Legal 
Education, he supports the view that open hypotheticals are particularly suitable ‘to 
demonstrate complexity and indeterminacy of legal analysis’, the very issues the 
Mexican legal profession is struggling with. Figure 2 shows how we can translate 
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Figure 2 Carney v. US 
 
Carney is ‘hiding behind’ the Fourth Amendment, which secures a principal value – 
privacy (for obvious semiotic reasons, using a battle that involves a siege, with Car-
ney the party under siege, would have also been a possibility, the Fourth Amend-
ment creating legal walls that correspond to the physical wall of his car). The social 
value underpinning the Fourth Amendment is privacy – values are indicated by the 
boxes with a cross bar. The prosecution is using a lead case, Carroll v. US, which 
established the vehicle exception, to pierce the Fourth Amendment protection. 
However, its case is supported by a whole range of other precedents, all of them 
mentioned, but none of them later discussed in the decision – they merely help to 
form the ‘centre of gravity’ we talked about above. These cases include US v. Ross 
and Cardwell v. Lewis. 
At this point counsel for the defence launches a counter-attack in the form of a 
hypothetical: what would the case be if a motor home had a tent attached to it? 
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Figure 2 A hypothetical attacking a precedent 
The aim of the attack by the hypothetical, visualized as round blobs on the left 
(hypotheticals are not precedents, so we use a symbol other than boxes), is to ‘over-
extend’ the precedent and lure it into territory where it can be attacked by the blue 
forces. By conceding, for example, that under the proposed interpretation of Carroll 
v. US, the tent too would be unprotected, the precedent is isolated from its support-
ing, more conservative cases. This allows it to be attacked by the privacy principle 
that underpins Carney’s case. Here is how a successful development would have 
looked like: Carroll takes the bait, overextends itself and is finally defeated by the 
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Figure 4 A precedent getting isolated and destroyed/restrictively distinguished) 
Maps are potentially semantic-rich environments – depending on the graphic skills, 
the environment can also be used to represent relevant features. Very common are 
indicators of height, a natural choice given the importance of holding the high 
ground in battles. So important is this feature of military campaigns that it found its 
way into ethical discourse, and the spatial representation of maps would make it 
possible to graphically represent the idea of ‘holding the moral (or legal) high 
ground’, putting an additional (and instantaneously visible) burden on an attacker. 
These representations of battles are common and predate computer animations by 
a considerable amount of time. What computers add in value though is their ability 
to incorporate them into animations. Particularly good examples can be found at 
the Art of Battle website.  The added dynamic element will be, we hope, a particu-
larly good teaching tool to aid the transition from the fixed, document-based pro-
cedure of the past to Mexico’s embrace of oral, adversarial and dynamic hearings 
that coincided with the introduction of precedent-based reasoning. As a next step, 
though, we hope to represent a number of interesting cases both as animated and 
static battle maps, using a variety of representation forms. Following this, we hope 
to test these on a student population, both as passive consumers and active creators 
of these maps. Should there indeed be a measurable benefit, the issue of balancing 
the demands of computer readability with the desirable freedom of the map users to 
develop representations that suit their personal cognitive style would have to be 
addressed. Jerome Frank, despairingly, characterized legal procedures as trial by 
combat. If this analysis is correct, and we think it is, then the techniques and meth-
ods that have been used to train new commanders should also be suitable to train 
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